Parliamentary Service Amendment (Parliamentary Budget Officer) Bill 2011

As we consider the amendment before us at this consideration in detail stage, what we are doing is asking ourselves the question: which of the two alternative models put forward, one by the member for North Sydney and one by the government, better gives effect to the policy objective that, we are all agreed, makes sense—a policy objective in which resources are available to the parliament, the legislative branch of government, to assist it in having available to it alternative expert advice on economic, financial and budgetary matters? It is a question of which scheme—which mechanism; which process—is best going to give effect to the principle upon which we are all in agreement.

Against that backdrop, there is a pretty clear contrast between the two alternative frameworks which have been put forward. The government's framework, laid out in proposed section 64E(2) and (3), specifically bars the Parliamentary Budget Office from carrying out certain functions such as preparing budget estimates. It also specifically constrains the Parliamentary Budget Office to use forecasts, parameters and fiscal estimates released by the Treasurer. By contrast, the scheme put forward by the member for North Sydney in his excellent amendment is a scheme under which the Parliamentary Budget Office has a maximum degree of discretion in performing its functions. In the words of the amendment, the Parliamentary Budget Officer is given the discretion to 'prepare, or have regard to, either or both of economic forecasts or budget estimates'. In other words, it is a provision which grants the maximum extent of discretion to the Parliamentary Budget Officer so that he or she is best placed to discharge the functions which this legislation is imposing upon him or her—namely, the function of being a provider of independent expert advice to the legislative branch of government.

When the policy suggestion was put forward by the coalition, and subsequently taken up in the negotiations between the Independents and the government, the underlying logic was to establish an independent body, an independent office which would provide a source of independent advice. There is no notion of being critical of the existing departments of state. There is no notion of saying that they are in some way inherently flawed in what they do, but there is a mature recognition that executive government will often have a different set of interests from the parliament, from the legislative branch. There is also a mature recognition that it makes sense to better inform the parliament to provide a source of specialist expertise to the parliament to allow it to discharge its weighty responsibilities.

If a consequence of these new arrangements is that there is a battle of ideas, that there is contestability in policy, that is no bad thing; indeed we on this side of the House say that is a good thing. But the one thing we say very specifically and very precisely about the two alternative schemes that are before the House this afternoon is that we are deeply suspicious of the bona fides of the government in putting forward the particular scheme it has, because we do not believe that the restrictions on the Parliamentary Budget Office contained in proposed section 64E(2) or the constraints on the sources to which it may have regard contained in 64E(3) adequately and sensibly give effect to the policy objective which all of us share in this debate, which is a Parliamentary Budget Office best able to provide independent advice to the parliament about these complex and important matters. It is on that basis that I believe the amendment put forward by the member for North Sydney ought to be supported this afternoon.